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Scholarship and Social Agitation

Albion W. Small

The primary purpose of this paper is to challenge the claims of that type of
scholarship which assumes superiority because it deals only with facts. The latest
god in the world's pantheon is science. The only orthodox theophanies of this
divinity have their eyes in the backs of their heads. The scholarship which has
the forward look is tolerated with the stepmotherly reservation that "it may be
useful in its way, but it is not science."
Very well; let us go about our business with the understanding that within
the scope of scholarship there is first science, and second something better than
science. That something better is first prevision by means of science, and second
intelligent direction of endeavor to realize the vision.
I would have American scholars, especially in the social sciences, declare
their independence of do-nothing traditions. I would have them repeal the law
of custom which bars marriage of thought with action. I would have them become
more profoundly and sympathetically scholarly by enriching the wisdom which
comes from knowing with the larger wisdom which comes from doing. I would
have them advance from knowledge of facts to knowledge of forces, and from
knowledge of forces to control of forces in the interest of more complete social
and personal life.
The scholars of this generation are so dazzled by the play of evolution that
they cannot see its operation in their own environment. Many an evolutionist
can trace the processes of progress in every moment of history except the present.
It is neither consistent nor intelligent to act as though evolution terminates in us.
The things of today are but crude products which yesterday began to shape,
which a thousand tomorrows will mould toward perfection. A primary inference
from the law of evolution as we now read it is the decree to every intelligent
person: "Apply today's force to make tomorrow's fact!"
Reprinted from The American Journal of Sociology, 1/5 (March, 1896).564-82 by permission of The
University of Chicago Press
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Men's instincts accept more frankly than their intellects the provisional and
mediate character of present institutions. In order to contend that improvement
is the present and the future order of the day, it is necessary to presume that the
things of the present are defective. This premise is virtually an impeachment of
established order. It is a reflection on accepted institutions. Hence it is easy for
conservatism to regard it as a letter of marque sanctioning piratical intentions
on the ship of state. Although every advance of civilization in the past has been
by virtue of the provisional character of institutions, which permitted a certain
self-surrender of the old order and the installation of a substitute, conservatism
is timid about becoming party to the continuation of this cosmic process. In
preferring the ills he had to others that he knew not of, Hamlet was the eternal
conservative.
Scholarship is likely to become retrospective, and so not conservative but
obstructive, in proportion to its insistence that nothing belongs in its province
except demonstrative evidence. The only things which to our minds are absolutely
certain are accomplished facts. Scholarship which would guard against becoming
speculation and adventure, dreads departure from this sure region of the hasbeen, for exploration of the somewhat conjectural realm of the more reasonable
and possible and desirable which is to be. But the stage of human evolution upon
which we have entered presents an order of facts which scholarship cannot much
longer ignore. Man is beginning to discover himself, and this self-discovery by
man incites to new world-discovery and world conquest.
Once only a human animal demanded of the world animal comforts. Now
this animal is become a self-conscious center of myriad wants, expressed in an
infinity of physical and psychical desires. Men are consequently attacking the
resisting material and moral environment at more points than ever before. In this
conflict mind wields the balance of power, and mind is swinging over into
alliance with man. This make-weight mind once decreed man's temporal damnation, under the theory that this mortal life is for the subjugation and repression
and crucifixion of man. Mind now begins to declare that this mortal life is man's
opportunity to possess and expand and enjoy. The irrepressible wants of this
newly self-asserting sovereign man make a new order of facts, which scholarship
may not despise. Laws of moral motion begin to discover themselves in man's
movements, as positively as the laws of physical motion in their sphere. Laws
of moral affinity begin to suggest psychical uniformities as regular as the action
of chemical affinity. The ultimate social fact—man—is a fact whose many phases
and many potencies already enter with new powers into the social equation. Man
always wanted life and liberty and happiness, but never did these wants mean
so many things to any man as they do to some men today. Never did the mass
of men bring within the sweep of their wants so large a fraction of that which
complete man will demand and obtain.
The things which to our view make life and liberty and happiness are more
and larger than to any previous men. Our bodies today are covetous of more and
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more complex satisfactions than physical man ever claimed before. Men's minds
once yearned for the one sedative of authority, they now thirst for the thousand
stimulants of criticism. Men's social wants seemed, a century ago, to be potentially assured, with the conquest of political freedom. Social man today finds
political freedom, without industrial security, a delusion, a fraud, and an insult.
The latest phase of man is thus a new order of fact. Scholarship cannot
contemplate these facts without finding itself face to face with the tardily unsealed
order of nature—"Be thou a forceful part of that continuous cosmic enterprise
which forever unmakes the things of today to recreate them in the things of
tomorrow!"
Man, tugging to master the contents of newly surcharged consciousness,
is the supreme fact which today's scholarship encounters. We cannot deal with
this fact without "forgetting the things that are behind and reaching forth unto
the things that are before." Scholarship must either abandon claims to the function of leadership, and accept the purely clerical role of recording and classifying
the facts of the past, or scholarship must accept the responsibility of prevision
and prophecy and progress.
Political philosophers, from Plato to Montesquieu, treated problems of government most of the time as though there were no deeper questions involved
than the efficiency of forms of administration. Social philosophers of certain
schools today would have us believe that the consummation of social philosophy
will be reached when we shall have formulated the physics of group reactions
in past and present human associations. The majority of contemporary social
"reformers" act as though society would at last have its foundations on the rock,
if it would adopt this or that expedient—civil service reform; equalized taxation;
the referendum; profit-sharing; government ownership; industrial arbitration. The
paramount duty of social scholarship at this moment is to reckon with the epochmaking fact that today's men have gradually cut the moorings of ethical and
social tradition after tradition, and that society is today adrift, without definite
purpose to shape its course, and without a supreme conviction to give it motion.
Let us listen to the anarchistic indictment of society.*
Injustice is enthroned in the statutes of civilized nations; for
example—in the laws relating to land tenure, to the money of commerce, to public franchises, to public and private corporations, to
the collection of debts, to the enforcement of contracts. In consequence of this perversion of law, the privileged class is built up at
the expense of the poor, the land of the United States has passed
into the hands of the few, opportunity for self-employment is closed,
wage slavery has been substituted, the condition of the poor is grow-

*Report of the Congress of Anarchists, Chicago, October 1893.
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ing worse. It follows that a republic is as impotent as monarchy to
do justice. Despotism belongs to the principle of government as such.
Let us hear from the other extreme. A Christian minister declares that
professed disciples of Christ must revise their working creeds after the following
fashion:*
It is the object of this book to point out some of the changes
in men's thinking which the present conditions of Christian society
most clearly indicate. There must be clearer ideas of the fatherhood
of God, and the brotherhood of man; there must be reconstruction
of ideas concerning the independence of the individual as related to
the solidarity of society; there must be revision of our ideas of the
sacred and the secular; there must be reconstruction of our ideas of
property; we must clarify our views of the relations of religion and
politics; we need to reconsider the relation of individual to public
opinion; we need to detect modern Pharisaism; we need to overcome
irrational partisanship.
If our practical principles are assailable at all these points, Dr. Gladden is
surely justified in his summary: "Needed social reconstruction depends upon a
new conception of life and duty."
Let us consider the anarchistic and the Christian diagnoses together as signs
of present psychic facts, and let us consider what they connote. These divergent
estimates of society are themselves symptoms of the unique condition of the
thinking parts of society. Men are more generally conscious than ever before of
a discrepancy between the demands made upon life by the various principles of
human desire, and the possible output of satisfaction from the operation of
traditional social doctrines and institutions. All our kicking against the social
pricks means that men are agreed that something is wrong, though they cannot
agree what is wrong.
Scholars ought to be able to see that the fault lies deeper than the popular
reformers suspect. All our contemporary discontent with social institutions and
conditions runs back to the fact that the present generation is trying to make
dead trunks of social ideas bear living fruit of social force. We are trying to feed
the humanity of today from the desiccated stalks of yesterday's conceptions. AH
the familiar denunciations of social evils, and of the individuals or classes that
are said to cause or aggravate them, point to the one radical fact which men
have hardly begun to admit, viz., that the words around which our civilization
has rallied no longer convey our ultimate ideas; or rather they stop short of
*Dr. Washington Gladden, Ruling Ideas of the Present Age

SCHOLARSHIP AND SOCIAL AGITATION

29

notions which we will accept as ultimate. They are irredeemable currency, and
men are clamoring for liquidation. Thus we declaim of "liberty," but men are
wondering whether we have begun to know wherein liberty consists. We have
boasted of "rights," but the suspicion is rife that the majority of men have never
understood a tithe of their rights, and that the rights which our institutions assure
are possibly not more than a tithe of the goods upon which complete men will
insist. We have appealed to "ethics," but at this late day there is no more open
question than, What is ethical? We declare the sacredness of life, but men are
asking, What is life? What does life presume? What does life involve? What
should life contain? To whom does the prerogative of life belong?
These conditions are the setting of the urgent problems that confront today's
men. Scholars are shirkers unless they grapple with these problems. It is for this
that society supports us. We are presumed to be exponents of the higher excellencies of thought and action. We are expected to hold up ideals of the best, to
guide the endeavors of the masses of men. It is squandering money to put more
endowments into the keeping of educational institutions that are not devoting
their energies in larger and larger proportion to search for solution of these moral
problems, together with the solution of the physical problems, through both of
which the larger welfare of men is to be secured.
Scholarship may get in its work in either or both of two ways: first, in
clarifying fundamental or general conceptions; second, in perfecting and applying
subordinate devices and plans. The second purpose of this paper is to indicate
by an illustration the sort of share which scholarship ought to have in prosecuting
the former of these methods. I turn, therefore, not to the most fundamental
relation which needs exposition, but to discussion of the institution of property,
with its incidents, inheritance and bequest. Certain agitators declare that the
institution of property itself, and still more its satellites, inheritance and bequest,
are inventions of criminal purpose to strengthen the strong and to weaken the
weak. Human welfare of every sort is so generally dependent upon property
relations that stable equilibrium in society can certainly not be expected so long
as men entertain and act upon incompatible conceptions of property and its
consequents. My argument is, then, that in this, as in every like case of impeachment of an existing institution, or in case of demand for trial of a new
institution, it is the scholar's duty to hold his services at the disposal of his
fellows, for the purpose of reaching permanent and convincing conclusions.
Let it be understood, then, that the position to be maintained in the discussion
which follows is that there is ground-course work for scholars in strengthening
the rational basis for settlement of disturbed or threatened social relations. For
illustration, property relations are selected, not because the considerations to be
dealt with are new to sociologists, nor because it is desirable to advertise individual opinions, but in order to make the point that, whether the assumptions
behind this particular institution of property are tenable or untenable, there is
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call for such review and restatement of the principles of property that we shall
have common premises for theory and practice with reference to details and
applications. The argument is that, as in the case of property, so in the case of
other social institutions and relationships, referee work by scholars is in demand.
The main contention throughout this paper is that when institutions hedged about
by the sanctions and sanctity of tradition begin to provoke men's skepticism, it
is the business of scholars to rise above the superstitions which forbid inquiry
into the rightfulness of the traditional, and to represent the people in dispassionate
examination of the things in question. Our relation to the people creates a demand
upon us to do this work for the people, with as little reluctance or prejudice as
though the things under examination were defective or untried mechanical inventions.
More than this, many men of all classes, business men and rich men, as
well as theorists and poor men, are beginning to cherish an ambition to assist
in so readjusting industrial relations that manhood may be held not less deserving
of conservation than property. The only way to save that purpose from deserved
ridicule is to discover flaws in the industrial premises which have logically led
to despicable conclusions.
I cannot wonder that hard-headed men of affairs have nothing but contempt
for those garrulous peddlers of reform programmes who can find no fallacies in
the postulates upon which industrial and political administration is based, but
declare implacable feud with the consequences of the postulates. Large and
satisfying improvement of present social order must wait upon deepening and
broadening of the foundations of order. Reforms cannot amount to much so long
as they aim principally at details of the finished social edifice.
It is, accordingly, one of the present duties of scholarship to reconsider all
that is assumed and involved in the existing institution of property. We must go
back to the immemorial perception that human beings cannot live to the best
advantage without mutuality. It is one of the conditions of large personal happiness that individuals shall be helped by their fellows to maintain personal
claims to things and opportunities, against all encroachment. Conversely, the
realization of this condition makes civilization first possible, then progressive.
It may come about, however, that the establishment and maintenance of private,
personal, possessive rights to things and opportunities, which were appropriate
and socially useful in a less complex civilization, may become obstructive and
reactionary in a more complex civilization. It is hardly to be doubted that we
have reached such a stage in civilization, and that our conditions call for partial
reconstruction of the philosophical basis on which the institutions of ownership
and property are supposed to rest.
To recall another elementary principle—it is not denied by anybody, so far
as I am aware, that ownership is a concession by organized society to persons
within the society. Whatever be the principles of abstract right to which indi-
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viduals may appeal, ownership, as an institution, is a gift of society to its
individual members, i.e., ownership, whether absolute or limited, is possible
only as men in masses agree to recognize and enforce ethical claims of single
or associated individuals.
This agreement is entered into on the part of society not because multitudes
of men think that single persons are more important, and deserve more consideration than the many, but because societies instinctively perceive that the interests of the many can be conserved only by safeguarding the interests of the
units. The many combine to establish and maintain what are held to be the just
claims of individual persons, because the good of the many is thereby assured.
Thus it comes about that the thing which is supposed to belong by right to the
individual is guaranteed to him in all civilized societies by the agreement of the
whole community.
When, however, it becomes apparent that the enforcement of these claims
to ownership is harmfully affecting the whole society, there sooner or later arises
suspicion that somehow or other mistakes have been committed in men's judgment as to what constitutes individual rights. Thus men have held ownership of
certain allegiance and service on the part of others; they have had legal ownership
of right to control the movements of others from place to place; of right to give
or withhold consent to the marriage of certain parties; men have had ownership
of right to exercise certain magistracies, to confer certain "livings," to be exempt
from certain pecuniary dues, etc. In the earlier history of these possessions the
claims under them have been regarded as applications of the principle, to every
man his own—suum cuique. It has dawned upon men later that these things were
no man's own, and, in the nature of the case, they cannot be, because they
deprive other men of a part of their own. Hence there have been striking changes
in conceptions of what may be owned, and of what constitutes just as contrasted
with legal title to ownership. Back of each separate doctrine and policy with
reference to ownership has been the vague tacit reservation that rights of exclusive
ownership must be compatible with, and tributary to, the general good.
Now, without attempting to draw a final and specific line between things
which may be owned and things which the common interest forbids men to hold,
except upon certain enforceable terms of use and release, I argue that we have
sufficient reason today for beginning to challenge the rationality of the prevailing
extension of the concession of ownership.
Let us resort to the homely precept: "It is lawful for a man to do what he
will with his own." Let us assume that the proposition is valid, but it raises the
preliminary question, "What is one's own?" The answer to that question is not
today as clear as it has seemed hitherto.
In the first place some men are surely forgetting that even in the fundamental
law of civilized states there is no such idea as absolute ownership by individuals.
In theory, approached in practice whenever necessity dictates, the state may
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impoverish every individual of its membership, to defend national honor and
national existence. Not goods alone are thus subject to social draft, but no citizen
can call even his life his own when his nation demands his service. The idea of
absolute ownership is therefore at best an accommodation.
But while states have grown so secure that the eminent domain and the final
ownership of the nation does not ordinarily put onerous limitations upon individual ownership of wealth, personal relations within modern states have so
changed that applications of the fiction of ownership have led to anomalous
relations between individuals and classes. Men are not only working today with
their shop and office mates in a real partnership, but we are working with
thousands of thousands whom we have never seen; yes, with thousands of
thousands who are no longer living. The legacies of past generations become
part of the equipment of the living generation, and we cannot reasonably refuse
to consider whether we have allowed certain classes of persons to appropriate
more of the heritage of the past than they may justly claim. The equipment with
which men work today can be divided into separate individual shares only at the
cost of incalculable embarrassment to industry. Before the days of machinery,
and aggregated capital, and the application of science to methods of production,
no calamity less than war, famine or pestilence could produce equal industrial
disturbance. Accordingly the reasons which have been held to make property
so sacred are today less simple, their interpretation is less evident, and their
relations are different from those which once obtained.
These changes call for revival and enforcement of a radical distinction
between classes of claims upon opportunities and things. As was said above,
absolute ownership is after all a legal fiction. Our lien upon things which we
call our own has recognized limits even in law, and there are still further limits
prescribed by justice to every man who has a conscience. But allowing for this
accommodation of ideas, it is true that as between man and man there are two
classes or degrees of just individual claim upon things and opportunities. I
venture to apply to these respectively the terms ownership and proprietorship.*
Probably there is little usage to support this antithetical use of the words, but
for our present purpose I may use the term ownership for the claims that are
practically absolute, and proprietorship for claims that have institutionalized
limits.
My thesis at this point is that we have brought over, from other social
conditions, concessions of rights to ownership which are anomalous and dan*The poverty of our vocabulary in this connection is doubtless an evidence of lack of precision in
our thought. We have no nouns for the things held under the different tenures which I want this
antithesis to represent. If the lawyers had not given the word personalty another meaning, I should
try to use it for possessions to which right of ownership may be conceded, and the word property
would then be left for the less absolute possessions, but even this usage would be arbitrary.
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gerous in present conditions. Moreover, if we continue to concede to individuals
ownership claims according to present legal rules, there is no escape from gradual
retrogression into more abrupt caste separation than ever existed before. I urge,
therefore, that the ethical and functional distinction (and I call it ethical because
it is functional) between ownership and proprietorship must receive sharper
definition, and must become more prominent and decisive. I do not profess
ability to complete this definition, but I may offer certain suggestions about the
principles by means of which the distinction may be drawn.
That must be recognized as one's own—necessary governmental deductions
being eliminated for simplicity—which is one's just portion of the fruits of one's
labor, whether independently or in combination with others. That must be recognized as property—for convenience left under the administration of the proprietor—which it is possible to utilize to the combined advantage of the worker
and of society. This vague and involved statement corresponds with the involutions of reality. The fact is that the legal qualifications of absolute ownership
are much less intimate than the automatic practical qualifications, whenever it
is attempted to couple ownership with use and enjoyment. The kinds and quantities of goods and opportunities which any man can appropriate without admitting
other men to some sort of partnership are limited indeed, and the point upon
which I am insisting is that so soon as this partnership is entered into, whether
for consumption or for production, absolute ownership ends, and a new relation
with new ethical limitations begins, viz., the relation which I designate as proprietorship. I mean more specifically that natural resources, accumulated capital,
perfected methods, processes, devices, no less than hygienic, chemical, medicinal discoveries, belong to man, not to men. The laws of nature make it impossible
for individuals to own them. The extent to which the laws of the state shall
become the accomplices of individuals, in turning proprietorship into monopoly,
is a matter for social intelligence to determine.
To develop this suggestion somewhat more in detail, things which are a
fair equivalent for the individual's labor, things which in their nature are useful
only as consumed by individuals, may fairly be considered proper objects of
absolute ownership in the sense already indicated. Thus, food, clothes, household
utensils, books, pictures, means of recreation, money held as the equivalent of
these, assuming of course that each is the rightful reward of the owner's service,
are indisputably objects of ownership. On the other hand, there are goods and
opportunities which cannot be exclusively owned without infringement of just
claims which have accrued to others. Thus any of the natural or artificial agencies
for controlling the universally necessary means of happiness, such as land in its
widest economic sense, acquired science, inventions, accumulated knowledge,
methods of organizing capital or labor, may have become available to men as
the result of the labor of individuals. Society ought to be willing to err on the
side of liberality in providing that such labor shall receive due reward. Our patent
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and copyright laws are intended to carry out this policy. After the laborer has
received his hire, however, the new power over nature which he has found out
how to exert should become an addition to the endowment of the race. Again
there are results of past and present labor and social combination in which the
combined product is vastly greater than the arithmetical sum of the contributions
of individuals, and in which the absolute share of individuals is undeterminable.
These classes of goods and opportunities cannot be claimed by right as any man's
own. They are correctly viewed only when they are regarded as equipments of
civilization, which are not primarily for consumption but for production. They
cannot be made the absolute possession of individuals without dispossessing
other individuals whose ethical claim to some of this social heritage is equally
clear. These latter classes of goods are reasonable objects of proprietorship, but
not of ownership.
Shall we then conclude that the institution of private property should be
abolished? No more than we are to conclude that private individuality should
be suppressed. Proudhon taught a doctrine more to be dreaded by the weak and
the poor than by the strong and the rich. Our conclusion is that we must keep
on learning how to socialize both individuality and possessions. Nor does this
conclusion involve toleration of the equally anarchistic assumption that present
forms of the institution of property are too sacred to be reshaped. The question,
"What may all of us profitably permit some of us to own?" is not closed, and
it will not be so long as human activities continue to grow complex. From the
point of view just defined, civilization is tending neither toward abolition of
property nor toward deification of property, but toward discrimination and delimitation of degrees of property. Scholars ought to be most effective agents in
promoting this gain. Proudhon was more picturesque than precise when he
charged that "property is robbery." It is the scholar's duty to search out the
fraction of truth in such wholesale error, to show that some property has been
robbery, and to assist in refining principles by which we may guard against
permitting any man to call his own what should be partly the franchise of others.
Without attempting to justify it by argument, I suggest one other point of
departure for the boundary line between ownership and proprietorship, viz.,
ownership is possession unlimited by obligation. Proprietorship is possession
under bonds for the use of the thing or opportunity possessed as a joint trust
with and for others interested. I simply assert that the measure of irresponsibility
permitted by our legal and moral codes to owners who should at most be proprietors, is an impeachment of our social intelligence.
The view thus defined is in equal contrast with plutocratic and with socialistic conceptions. The type "proprietor" here contemplated would be neither
the plutocratic "owner" of our acquaintance, nor the expropriated ward of the
state, into which the present owner is transformed in the socialistic vision. The
"proprietor" here contemplated would be a new order of manager-magistrate.
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He would be created not by state appointment but by industrial selection. He
would serve because fit to serve. He would draw pay in accordance with his
value to the business. He would have the same relation to the business, after the
term of his usefulness had expired, that retired political magistrates now have
to the government in a democratic state.
I have thus presented only the syllabus of an argument, none of which is
new, but simply newly related. I do not presume that this brief will be conclusive.
I hope that it will be of some effect in winning assent to the assertion that the
postulates concerning property which society is accepting offer points for reconsideration.
To further emphasize this claim, the illustration may be extended to consideration of the probable effect upon certain corollaries of the current conceptions of property, in case anything like the principles of discrimination which
I have proposed should be adopted. It would be interesting to trace the logical
consequences of such discrimination as effecting the theoretical relations between
stockholders and employees. As this subject could not be treated briefly, further
illustrations will be confined to the institutions of inheritance and bequest.
Basing my position on the ethics of ownership and proprietorship just posited, I deny that there is any necessary reason for supposing that the privilege
of bequest must forever be added to the emoluments of proprietorship. It will
doubtless for a long time be expedient to continue the addition of that incident,
but it is an addition and by no means an element inherent in proprietorship itself.
In other words, nothing which is property merely is to be considered necessarily
subject to the bequest of the proprietor, or, in the other case, no man has any
natural right to inherit what was only the property of a relative.
This conclusion was contained by implication in the distinction above proposed between ownership and proprietorship. Proprietorship involves service.
In one of its elements proprietorship is trusteeship. The legitimate social assumption behind maintenance of the privilege of bequest is that the service
supposed to accompany proprietorship will be secured better under the sanctions
of bequest, or of prescribed lines of inheritance, than by any available alternative.
Thus it is supposed superior utility, not inherent sanctity, which supports these
accidents of proprietorship. Bequest is not an essential incident of proprietorship,
and Herbert Spencer's attempt to make it such by calling it a "postponed gift"
convinces only those who had made up their minds before; because the right of
gift is not properly an incident of proprietorship either. Transfer of possessions
from one person to another is socially justifiable only on the presumption that
the service belonging with the proprietorship will be equally well performed
after the transfer.
If a person appointed as guardian of a child or as receiver of a corporation
should venture to delegate his office to another person incompetent to perform
its duties, he would be held legally responsible for the mismanagement of his
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representative. The law rightly makes such transfer of function either a crime
or punishable neglect. Now that which is contrary to public policy between living
men cannot by legal decree be made entirely satisfactory as the regular order
between living persons and the shade of a dead man. If it is contrary to public
policy for a father to have liberty while living to put an incompetent son in
charge of a business which it is the father's duty to manage, it is also and much
more subversive of public interest to establish for that son an owner's right in
such management in case of the father's death. The only ground upon which
these propositions may be challenged is the presumption that a poor social device
is the best possible device; but neither in mechanics nor in civics is limitation
of possibility assumable until the limits of experiment have been reached.
In order to show, therefore, the invalidity of the presumptions by which the
institutions of bequest and inheritance are buttressed, I call up the perception
that ownership of the managerial functions which are essential to the administration of capitalistic enterprise is a concession by society, for which there is
plain historical ground, but that ground is not sufficient to justify recognition
of such ownership as a natural right. Claim to control of such a function, to the
extent of liberty to confer it upon another at will, regardless of his fitness to
discharge the function, is as baseless in ethics as the obsolete claim of political
classes to the right of conferring political magistracies at will upon relatives and
favorites.
The conventional doctrine in the premises would reply to these claims;
"But the guardianship of minor children or the receivership of a corporation is
a responsibility for other people's interests. The law necessarily limits the agent's
liberty to delegate such responsibility. There is no proper parallel, however,
between this relation and that of a great employer managing his own business.
Consequently the analogy just alleged does not exist, and there is no such
anomaly as that asserted in permitting gift bequest or inheritance of captaincies
of industry, regardless of managerial fitness."
My rejoinder is that this demurrer represents the very lack of intelligence
that I am pointing out with reference to the social significance of business
management. The organizer or manager of a capitalistic enterprise is as truly a
trustee of the interests of others—viz., both stockholders and employes—as is
the guardian of an orphan, or the receiver of an insolvent corporation, or the
master of a passenger steamship on the Atlantic. The business is created by the
union of many men; it is the combined action of many men; it operates for many
men. In short it is of, for, and by not one, but many. The organizer contributes
much brain power, and perchance much wealth power and brawn power, to the
combination; but after all, these are only factors, not the whole of the combination. Over against all the ownership rights which do and should accrue to such
manager, social responsibilities on the part of the management arise and develop
with every stage in the progress of the business. These responsibilities are ob-
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ligations to cooperators in the business, and to the society more remotely affected
by the business. These obligations fix the ethical limits of ownership, and define
the duties incumbent on proprietorship.
Conceding, then, every item of justly acquired ownership on the part of the
manager, when we turn to the obligation side of the ledger page we discover
that with this ownership there has accrued a burden of responsibility for administrative labor, and that many persons have a moral lien upon the discharge of
that responsibility. No mere owner of a part of the business, not even the legal
owner of the whole stock, can obtain such discharge from this responsibility that
he is ethically justified in ignoring it, or in making the disposition of it a matter
of his own arbitrary decision. The other parties interested have an immanent
claim to assurance that, when the managerial function is transferred, it shall go
to managerial ability, so that the material and intellectual and moral assets of
the business may not be dissipated. In a word, the managerial element in capitalistic enterprise is in its very nature fiduciary, vicarious, responsible, i.e.,
proprietary at most.
In this prolonged illustration I have incidentally presented my own beliefs,
but not because they are the chief concern in the argument. I cite them merely
to illustrate what I mean when I claim that all scholarship within the field of the
social sciences ought to be made to converge at last upon criticism of capital
positions in our social order. I have no sympathy with nor confidence in any
conception of sociology which is satisfied with abstractions, or which does not
keep well in mind the relation of all research to the living interests of living
men. Scholars, and especially sociological scholars, are either wrong or wronged
when they are said to endorse and support the presumption that whatever is in
society is right, or if not right at least unavoidable. I plead for that creditable
and worthy agitation by scholars, which is not hysterical fuss and pother with
symptoms and specifics, but rather calm and patient exploration of conditions
and causes and principles.
Referring to the second class of opportunities inviting the sociological
scholar, I content myself with saying that scholars might exalt both their scholarship and their citizenship by claiming an active share in the work of perfecting
and applying plans and devices for social improvement and amelioration. It is
not only betrayal of his social trust, it is surrender of the best elements of his
professional opportunity, for the sociological scholar to withdraw from affairs,
and attempt to grow wise by rearranging the contents of his personal consciousness. The most impressive lesson which I have learned in the vast sociological
laboratory which the city of Chicago constitutes is that action, not speculation,
is the supreme teacher. If men will be the most productive scholars in any
department of the social sciences, let them gain time and material by cooperating
in the social work of their community. I would have every sociological scholar
share constantly in some concrete work of two specific kinds: first, work which
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the thoughtful and careful prosecute for the benefit of the thoughtless and the
careless; second, work which the enterprising and efficient organize for the better
security of their own social interests. The line of argument with which I would
justify this ideal may be inferred from reference to the career of a certain reputable
society of which many teachers of the social sciences are members. The declared
object of the association is commendable, viz., the improvement of city governments in the United States. The programme into which the society has gravitated is discussed rather than action. Its accomplishments up to date very
naturally amount to ocular proof of the futility of talk. A scientific label for this
respectable body would read: A National Association for the Propagation and
Enjoyment of Melancholy over the Misdoings of Municipalities.
There is better work for scholars than criticism of men and measures from
a distance. It is timely to proclaim a different ideal for American scholars from
that which has dominated the learned world for the last fifty years. May American
scholarship never so narrow itself to the interests of scholars that it shall forfeit
its primacy among the interests of men!

